Face obscuration is often needed by law enforcement or mass media outlets to provide privacy protection. Sharing sensitive content where the obscuration or redaction technique may have failed to completely remove all identifiable traces can lead to life-threatening consequences. Hence, it is critical to be able to systematically measure the face obscuration performance of a given technique. In this paper we propose to measure the effectiveness of three obscuration techniques: Gaussian blurring, median blurring, and pixelation. We do so by identifying the redacted faces under two scenarios: classifying an obscured face into a group of identities and comparing the similarity of an obscured face with a clear face. Threat modeling is also considered to provide a vulnerability analysis for each studied obscuration technique. Based on our evaluation, we show that pixelation-based face obscuration approaches are the most effective.
Introduction
From TV news to Google StreetView, object obscuration has been used in many applications to provide privacy protection. Law enforcement agencies use obscuration techniques to avoid exposing the identities of bystanders or officers. To remove this identifiable information, Gaussian blurring or pixelation methods are commonly used. Median filtering is also used due to its simple implementation and its non-linearity, which translates to higher information distortion when compared to linear filters such as the Gaussian filter. These obscuration techniques are able to successfully prevent humans from recognizing the obscured objects. However, machine learning approaches can identify these objects using the subtle information left in the obscured images. In this paper, we focus on the performance analysis of the most common obscuration techniques for face redaction. Specifically, we study Gaussian Figure 1 : An illustration of the scenario studied in this paper. Given N identities with undistorted faces, we want to see if it is possible to determine the identity of the obscured query face.
blurring, median blurring, and pixelation to answer the following question: "How effective are these methods at concealing identity?" Although these approaches are widely used by Internet news outlets, social media platforms, and government agencies, their performance has not been objectively measured. The lack of a formal study of these obscuration techniques makes them vulnerable to attacks. As shown by McPherson et al. [7] , a deep learning model with a simple structure is able to identify individuals by analyzing their highly pixelated and blurred faces. This indicates that human perception is no longer the gold standard to examine the effectiveness of the obscuration methods. Therefore, we need to consider them under scenarios that allow us to see if we can extract the identifiable information from the obscured face, as shown in Figure 1 . In particular, we want to test whether face identification is possible by comparing a distorted face against a set of undistorted reference faces and finding the closest match. In order to analyze the vulnerability of these obscuration methods, we design multiple threat models based on the attacker's knowledge of the obscuration method used. Our simplest threat model assumes that the attacker has no information of any obscuration methods.
In the most challenging threat scenario, we consider that the attacker knows the exact type of the obscuration method and its hyperparameters used. These unexplored threat models are necessary to offer a complete vulnerability analysis under realistic situations.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows. First, we design a principal component analysis (PCA) based method to identify redacted faces under the face identification scenario. We also examine if deep learning based methods can be extended to the face verification scenario. Finally, we provide a comprehensive analysis of the obscuration performance of Gaussian blurring, median blurring, and pixelation under different threat models.
Related Work
Face Obscuration Methods. The goal of face obscuration is to remove all the identifiable facial information to prevent identification. As previously mentioned, Gaussian blurring and pixelation are frequently used in many commercial applications and social media sites. However, these techniques are not reliable. As we will show in Section 4, a poor choice for the kernel size of the Gaussian filter is not able to remove all identifiable information. An extreme resort to prevent information leaking is to simply gray out the entire facial region by setting all pixels in the facial area to a fixed value. However, this approach is rarely used because its visual effect is unpleasant, especially if there are many faces to be redacted. To overcome this issue, a variety of approaches have been proposed that try to balance the removal of identifiable information while preserving some facial features.
The first set of approaches, known as k-same methods [9, 4, 2] , attempt to group faces into clusters based on personal attributes such as age, gender, or facial expression. Then, a template face for each cluster is generated. These methods are able to guarantee that any face recognition system cannot do better than 1/k in recognizing who a particular image corresponds to, where k is the minimum number of faces among all clusters [4] . In Newton et al. [9] and Gross et al. [4] , they simply compute the average face for each cluster. Therefore, the obscured faces are blurry and cannot handle various facial poses. Du et al. [2] use the active appearance model [1] to learn the shape and appearance of faces. Then, they generate a template face for each cluster to produce obscured faces with better visual quality.
Generative adversarial network (GAN) methods [21, 17] are able to produce more realistic faces, since their discriminator is designed to guide the generator by distinguishing real faces from generated faces. Wu et al. [21] propose a model that generates an obscured face directly from the original face based on conditional adversarial networks [8] . A contrastive loss is used to enforce that the obscured face is different from the input face and a structure similarity loss is used to maintain the correspondence between the two faces. However, because they need to directly input the original faces, their obscuration performance is not guaranteed. To overcome this, Sun et al. [17] propose a model that is able to generate an obscured head without the original face region.
Privacy Analysis of Obscuration Methods. As mentioned in Section 1, although Gaussian blurring and pixelation are widely used, these methods might still leak sensitive information. Dufaux and Ebrahimi, and Sah et al. [3, 13] provide an analysis of the obscuration performance of common face identifiers and show the ineffectiveness of current obscuration methods. By using a simple deep learning model, McPherson et al. [7] also show that obscured images still contain enough information to perform accurate identification. They uncover the identity of images obscured with Gaussian blurring, pixelation, and privacy-preserving photo sharing (P3) [12] methods. Oh et al. [10] also propose a semi-supervised model that is able to identify the face under large variations in pose.
To extend the previous literature [3, 13, 7, 10] , we first consider the face identification scenario. By mapping faces to known identities under different threat models, we analyze the vulnerability of each obscuration method. However, the requirement of known identities weakens this kind of analysis, since query faces usually come from unknown identities. To overcome this, we also provide a threat analysis under a more challenging and realistic setup: the face verification scenario. Specifically, we want to measure the similarity of an unknown redacted face to clear target faces. Since it allows the exposure of unknown identities, this scenario is more realistic than the face identification scenario.
Proposed Method
To evaluate the performance of the obscuration methods, we introduce the threat scenarios and face identification models.
Threat Model
In our model, the attacker aims to identify the redacted faces based on the information still present in the obscured images. To be clear, we define attacker as a face recognition system that tries to reveal the identity of the obscured faces. We design three threat models, which vary on how much information about the used obscuration approach is available to the attacker.
• Threat model T 1 assumes the attacker has no information of any obscuration method, which means that the attacker is only able to learn the facial features used for identification from clear faces. During the testing phase, it needs to extract the facial features from the obscured faces without any prior knowledge. • Threat model T 2 assumes the attacker is aware of some obscuration methods, but not the same method used in the testing phase. This model provides more information to the attacker, since different obscuration methods may share similarities in terms of identifying facial features.
• Threat model T 3 assumes the attacker knows the exact type of the obscuration method and its hyperparameters, like the kernel size of Gaussian blurring or the pixel size of pixelation. Compared to T 2 , T 3 provides the attacker with more information to identify the obscured faces.
Obscured Face Identification
For the obscured face identification problem, we assume a fixed number of identities. We treat this identification problem as a classification problem where the number of classes is equal to the number of identities. Compared to the verification task, this identification problem is easier to solve. We can design a simple identifier to compare the performance of different obscuration methods.
PCA is used for reducing data dimensionality and one of its application is facial recognition (also known as "Eigenfaces") introduced by Turk et al. [18] . The eigenfaces representation develops a fixed linear basis for the facial appearance with low dimensionality. It represents any face with the vector of coefficients of the linear combination. Figure  2 shows an example of eigenfaces. We will briefly formulate the PCA approach as introduced by Turk et al. [18] . Then, we will present our model for the obscured face identification problem based on PCA.
We first denote the training images as
where N is the dimension of image and M is the number of images in the training set.
The average face shown in Figure 2 is given by
The l-th eigenface (eigenvector) u l can be obtained from the sample covariance matrix C which is defined as
where
Since the covariance matrix C is in R N ×N , it is not practical to compute its eigenvectors directly. Instead, we compute the eigenvectors ν l of the matrix A T A ∈ R M ×M and then compute u l based on the following relationship:
Note that the proof of Equation 1 can be found in [18] . Afterwards, we can find a linear combination of these eigenfaces to approximately reconstruct a new face image bŷ
where K is the number of eigenfaces we select (K ≤ M ) and we further denote the projection weights as
We can then perform face identification given a query face using a classifier based on its projection weights Ω from the PCA approach, which can be defined aŝ
where Y = {1, 2, . . . , I} is the identity label set when the total number of identities is I. Since the number of identities cannot be infinite, this method can only be applied to the obscured face identification problem. In our paper, we use a multi-layer perceptron (MLP) with one hidden layer as the face classifier.
Obscured Face Verification
The obscured face verification problem is defined as: given an obscured face and a clear face, decide if the two faces come from the same person or not.
In order to solve this verification problem, we project the image vector x ∈ R N to a lower-dimension latent vector in R D , where faces from the same person are closer together than faces from different people. Based on this idea, Schroff et al. [15] design a deep learning model, known as FaceNet, directly learning the mapping function transferring from the image space R N to the compact Euclidean space R D . The distance from each point in the Euclidean space represents the facial similarity. The model is trained with the triplet loss, which enforces a margin between the faces from the same identity and other faces from different identities in the Euclidean space. Define the mapping function as f : R N → R D and given an image x ∈ R N , the corresponding projected point in the Euclidean space is f (x) ∈ R D . Denote the anchor face as x a , positive face as x p (with the same identity as x a ) and negative face as x n (with a different identity than x a ). The objective of the triplet loss can be formulated as
where α is a predefined margin. By rearranging the terms in Equation 2, we can define the triplet loss function as
where [ * ] + is the function that clips all negative values to 0. Selecting challenging triplets is crucial for fast convergence. Therefore, instead of randomly sampling the valid triplets, as proposed by Hermans et al. [5] , we input a batch of images with multiple identities into the model and select all valid triplets to compute the triplet loss. The valid triplet has three faces with two of them coming from the same person and the surplus one coming from the different identity. The workflow of the FaceNet model in the training phase is shown in Figure 3 , which inputs a batch of faces, computes the encoded vectors and calculates the triplet loss to train the model. With the knowledge of triplet loss in hand, we can design our model as shown in Figure 4 . The objective for our model is to ensure that the distance from the obscured face to the clear face from the same identity is closer than the distance between two different identities. We use two separate deep learning models with the same structure to extract the facial features from the obscured faces For the inference phase, we use obscured face and a clear face as inputs to the two mapping functions, f o and f c and compare the L 2 distance given the predefined threshold value to determine if the two faces come from the same person or not. The distance threshold value can be obtained based on the value that maximizes the identification accuracy of the validation set.
Experiments
In this section, we describe our experiments. First, we design a set of experiments for the identification task to provide a quantified analysis of different obscuration methods. Then, we extend them to the verification problem using the deep learning model to test these obscuration methods in this more realistic scenario.
Datasets
For the identification experiments, we use two datasets: the AT&T dataset [14] and the labeled face in the wild (LFW) dataset [6] and for the verification experiments, we use the YouTube face dataset [20] . The AT&T dataset provides 400 images of size 92 × 112 from 40 identities under different lighting conditions and facial expressions. We choose this dataset in order to compare the results from previous work [7, 13] . Moreover, the LFW dataset contains 13,000 images from 1,680 identities collected from the internet, and compared to the AT&T dataset it is more challenging in terms of scales and image quality. We use this dataset to provide a comprehensive threat analysis of the obscuration methods. Lastly, the YouTube face dataset contains 621,126 images of 1,595 identities (about 389 images per identity) which is much larger than the LFW dataset.
Obscured Face Identification Experiment
Experimental Design. We design several experiments to quantify the performance of the three obscuration methods: Gaussian blurring, pixelation and median blurring. In order to measure the identification accuracy, based on the design in Section 3.2, we train a PCA model with 150 eigenfaces and a 3-layer perceptron (the dimension of the hidden layer is 1024) as a classifier.
As mentioned in Section 4.1, we first train and test our model using the AT&T dataset to analyze the performance of Gaussian and median blurring with kernel sizes: 5, 15, 25 and 45, and pixelation with pixel sizes: 2, 4, 8, 16. Since there are 10 images for each identity, similar to [7, 13] , we use 8 faces for training and 2 for testing. In order to compare the results, we use the top-1 accuracy as our metric.
We use the more challenging LFW dataset to provide a comprehensive analysis based on the aforementioned threat models. We remove the identities that have fewer than 25 faces in the dataset, which provides us with 2588 images from 42 people. We also convert the images into grayscale and use the Viola-Jones face detector [19] to detect faces. Afterward, we resize the cropped faces as 92 × 112, which is the same size as the AT&T dataset and choose the kernel (pixel) sizes as 5, 15, 25 and 45. In this experiment, we choose larger pixel sizes for the pixelation method than the experiments using the AT&T dataset to provide a more challenging situation. To evaluate the effectiveness of the obscuration methods, we use the cumulative match characteristic (CMC) curve as suggested by Dufaux and Ebrahimi [3] to compare the identification accuracy with respect to the identification rank.
We designed three experiments based on the three threat models to evaluate the obscuration methods. In the first experiment which is designed for T 1 , the identifier is trained with the set of clear images and tested with obscured images. In the second experiment which is designed for T 2 , the identifier is trained on both clear and obscured images and tested with the obscured images of the obscuration methods not used in the training set. In the third experiment which is designed for T 3 , the identifier is trained on both clear and obscured images and tested with the obscured images employing the same obscuration methods.
Result. Table 1 shows the results of top-1 accuracy for face recognition on the different obscured images of the AT&T dataset. Note that McPherson et al. [7] used a deep learning model and Sah et al. [13] used a support vector machine classifier based on the features from the PCA approach. The Original column indicates that the deep learning approach yields the best identification accuracy, which shows that the CNN model is able to handle the facial features better than PCA-based approaches including ours and Sah et al. [13] . For the Gaussian blurring and median blurring, the results indicate that our model is able to identify the faces even when a significant amount of facial information has been obscured. As shown in Figure 5 , when we increase the kernel size of the Gaussian and median filter, the facial features such as eyes or noses no longer exist in the images. Since there are only 10 images for each identity and only two of them are used for testing, the identifier is still able to identify the highly obscured face only from its remaining boundary of the facial region. For the pixelation method, the results from McPherson et al. [7] yield the best identification accuracy with the increasing pixel size. This shows that the CNN model is able to identify the faces even without noticeable facial features because of the small scale of the dataset.
The pixelation results from our model show that it has a better obscuration performance as the pixel size increases. This is because pixelation is not only able to remove the facial features, but also the boundary of the facial region. Comparing the results from pixelation to the two blurring methods, we can see that the pixelation method is able to remove more identifiable information than Gaussian and median blurring. Figure 6 shows the results for our PCA method for the three experiments with different obscuration methods and different kernel sizes for the LFW dataset. As a baseline, the results in Figure 6a indicate that without any obscuration the rank-1 and rank-5 accuracies are about 62% and 85%, respectively, based on the curve marked as Original.
For treat model T 1 in experiment I, comparing the curves with different kernel sizes, all three methods have a better obscuration performance (i.e., lower identification precision) as the kernel size increases. Comparing the curves of different methods, the Gaussian and median filters with a kernel size of 5 almost have no difference from the results without any obscuration in the testing set. As shown in Figure for the pixel size of 45. Moreover, the Gaussian and median filters with a kernel size of 45 also have a good performance, but it is still worse than the pixelation method with a pixel size of 15, 25 and 45.
For treat model T 2 in experiment II, after adding the obscured images to the training set the identification precision of Gaussian and median filters increases, while the results of the pixelation method almost remain the same. This is caused by the pixelation with a large pixel size, which not only removes the identifiable facial features like eyes and mouth, but also the outline of the face as mentioned in the previous experiment. Although the Gaussian and median filters can also obscure the identifiable information, the remaining facial outline provides the classifier information for identification.
For treat model T 3 in experiment III, if we train with the obscured images with the same obscuration operation used in the testing set, the obscuration performance for all methods will decrease. This can be especially seen for the pixelation method with a pixel size of 45, although it still achieves the best performance.
In summary, based on the results of obscured face identification, the pixelation method achieves the best obscuration performance compared to the Gaussian and median blurring methods.
Obscured Face Verification Experiment
Experimental Design. As previously mentioned, the deep learning method [7] yields the best performance even with the biggest pixel size. However, since the AT&T dataset experiment only has two images per identity for testing, the performance could be different when dealing with a larger dataset. Therefore, in order to further examine the obscuration performance of a larger dataset, we design a verification experiment. As mentioned in Section 4.1, we use the YouTube face dataset for this verification experiment and we split the dataset into training, validation, and testing with ratios of 0.6, 0.2 and 0.2 with cropped faces of 112 × 112. We also do random rotation ranging from [−30
• , 30
• ] for data augmentation to create more variation of facial poses. As suggested by Hermans et al. [5] , we empirically choose a batch size of 128 with 4 images per identity. For the deep learning structure, we choose the VGG [16] model with output dimension 128 for both the obscured mapping function f o and the clear mapping function f c , since this model has been successfully implemented for facial recognition [11] . For the experiment design, we continue the third experiment (threat model T 3 ) in Section 4.2, which assumes that we know the obscuration type and train/test on the same obscuration method, including Gaussian blurring, median blurring, and pixelation. As shown in Figure 7 , we still choose the same kernel/pixel sizes as in the previous identification experiments (5, 15, 25 and 45). During the testing phase, we sample face pairs from the same identity and different identities evenly. For the performance metric, since the face verification problem is just a binary classification problem, we choose the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve to examine the performance and use its area under the curve (AUC) as the numerical metric.
Result. As shown in Figure 8 , similar to the results in Section 4.2, with the increase of kernel/pixel size, the three obscuration methods have a better obscuration performance. Observing the different obscuration methods with the same kernel/pixel sizes, the pixelation method yields the best obscuration performance, which confirms the results from Section 4.2. The performance of pixelation with a pixel size of 5 is even better than the Gaussian and median blurring with a kernel size of 15. Based on the visual effect from Figure 7 , the abrupt edges generated from the pixelation method remove more identifiable facial information. Comparing the results of Gaussian and median blurring, the median blurring with a kernel size of 45 is slightly better than Gaussian blurring, since the facial details (eye region or nose) are completely removed when the kernel size increases.
As shown in Figure 9 , we also produce visualization results to illustrate the performance of each obscuration methods in a more realistic scenario. We pick 6 clear faces from the YouTube face dataset (as shown on the right side of each image in Figure 9 ) and select an obscured image from the testing set. We intentionally add several challenging reference faces among the 6 faces in order to create extra difficulty for the model, like the first, fourth and fifth faces. The bar next to each clear face indicates the distance between the clear face and the obscured face to its immediate left and the highlighted green bar represents the face with the minimum distance. Note that the correct match is the second face from the top. Therefore, our model can correctly detect the obscured face from the Gaussian and median blurring with a kernel size of 15 (as shown in Figure 9a and 9b) and fails on the pixelation method with a pixel size of 5 (as shown in Figure 9c ).
In summary, based on the results, the pixelation method achieves the best obscuration performance, which is similar to the results in the identification experiments.
Conclusion
In this paper, we provide a comprehensive analysis of three obscuration methods: Gaussian blurring, median blurring, and pixelation. We design a set of experiments to ex- amine if we are able to identify the obscured faces using a PCA based method and a deep learning based method. Based on the experiment results, we show that the pixelation method achieves the best performance since it brings abrupt edges, which improve the effectiveness of the face obscuration. Obscured faces using Gaussian and median blurring with a big kernel size are still able to be identified by our methods, although they are already unrecognizable by a human. Therefore, the designers of redaction systems need to be aware of choosing an effective obscuration method like pixelation and cannot only rely on human perception to determine a successful obscuration.
